Approved For Release 2003/04/15. CR-RD 79T00975A005600310001-5

25X1

5 April 1961

25X1

Copy No. C

# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN

25X1



25X1

State Dept. review completed

## TOP SECRET

5 April 1961

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

### CONTENTS

25X1


2.	Congo:	Relations	still te	ense bet	ween	Tshombé's	forces
	and UN	in Elisabe	thville	. (Page	tt)		

25X6

- 4. USSR-India: Soviet presidium member Suslov to attend Indian Communist party congress. (Page 111)
- 5. Ceylon Communist China: Annual rice-rubber barter agreement renewed. (Page tit)

25X1





5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

Congo: An agreement to return to the status quo at 25X1 Elisabethville airport, with Katangan troops and a Swedish UN contingent exercising joint control, apparently has papered over the immediate cause of the 3 April confrontation between UN and Katangan forces. The incident seems to have been set off by the Katangans, who attempted to block the airport runway and were apprehended and disarmed by the Swedes. Tshombe's regime remains apprehensive that the UN will attempt to airlift Indian troops into southern Katanga from Kamina. This distrust has been communicated to the civilian population and the armed forces, and civilian demonstrations against the UN occurred on 4 April. In a discussion in New York with American and British officials, Hammarskjold indicated that he is hopeful relations between the UN and the Leopoldville regime will im-25X1 prove. He remains adamant, however, that UN military units must be readmitted to the port of Matadi in the near future. He disclosed that in an effort to meet Congolese objections, his representative in Leopoldville was being instructed to suggest that the force in the port might be limited to 100 Nigerian police for the time being. He said he was asking for an early answer and stated that if no favorable reply were received, he would bring the question before the Security Council. Soviet presidium member Brezhnev told the Swiss ambassador recently that the USSR has little interest or hopes in the Congo but is going to use the issue as a means of obtaining its objectives concerning the UN Secretariat, including the removal of Secretary General Hammarskjold. 25X1 (Backup, Page 3) 25X6 (Map) 5 Apr 61 ii DAILY BRIEF 25X1

25X6	25χήroved For Release 20	03/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00	975A <b>&amp;S</b> 5600310001-5	5
25X1	USSR-India: M. A. presidium and secretaring Communist parties, is Indian Communist party April. The decision to tral role in the Sino-Soudrafting of the resolution of Communist parties, split between those elemward Moscow and the ground line. Suslov may at the Indian party, reflect India's foreign policy hat the past few months.	reportedly scheduled is sixth congress whi send Suslov, who has riet dispute and particle at the November 19 is probably related to nents of the Indian particle which generally also be bringing new iting the Soviet Union's	to attend the ch opens on 7 splayed a cencularly in the conference of the deepening rty oriented tofollows the Peinstructions to sconcern that	no
25X1	(Backup, Page 5)			25X1
Ceylon - Communist China: Colombo and Peiping on 4 April signed the annual protocol to their second five-year rice-rubber barter agreement (1958-62). The 1961 proto- col calls for a return to the higher level of trade which ob- tained from 1953 through 1959. The resumption of previous trade levels stems more from Ceylonese economic necessity than from the neutralist Ceylonese Government's policy of increasing the bloc's small share of the island's trade. Last year Colombo eventually had to buy considerably more rice from China than the reduced amount specified in the annual contract. The Chinese rice commitment to Ceylonset at 200,000 tons for 1961is to be met by re-exports of the				<i>o  </i> ← 25X1
25X1	rice Peiping is purchas  5 Apr 61	DAILY BRIEF	 iii	
	o whi or		25X1	



25X1 25X1

Situation in the Congo	25X1
The tension in Elisabethville is unlikely to interfere with Tshombe's reported plans to move on Kabalo in the northern part of Katanga, although the operation may be delayed some-	
what.  white and African units have been airlifted to Kongolo, north of Kabalo, and a move southward is imminent.  Hammarskjold stated on 3 April that in his opinion, the presence of Indian troops at Kamina had brought Tshombé's offensive to a halt and a resumption of the operation was unlikely. However, the commanders in northern Katanga are likely to base their estimate of UN military effectiveness on the refusal of the Nigerian troops at Manono to intervene in the battle there. The operation thus may be undertaken despite the enlarged UN force in Katanga.	25X1
Hammarskjold said he believed that the Congolese in Leopoldville were becoming apprehensive of Tshombe's ambitions and are happy to see the UN exerting pressure on Katanga. The 24-hour time limit set by Hammarskjold for a reply from Leopoldville probably is a bargaining position and subject to modification. Hammarskjold does feel, however, that a prompt settlement of the Matadi dispute is a prerequisite for an improvement in relations between the UN and Leopoldville	25X1

25X1

5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

25X1

USSR Reportedly Will Send a Top Leader to Indian Party Congress

25X1

Suslov, a leading Soviet ideologist, led delegations to the French Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1959 and to the Italian Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1960. He also visited Great Britain as a guest of the British Parliament in 1947, toured the Brussels World Fair in 1958, and revisited England "informally" at the invitation of the British Labor party to promote Anglo-Soviet relations. His prospective trip to India, the first he has made to an Asian country, points up the seriousness with which the Soviet leaders view the inroads Chinese concepts have made in a party in which USSR has long had the predominant influence.

there will be no Chinese delegates at the party congress. The Chinese had apparently intended to have the delegation to the just concluded World Peace Council meeting in New Delhi remain in India to represent them at the congress. The Indian Government--apparently deliberately discriminating against Peiping--reportedly turned down the delegation's requests for visa extensions while approving visas for other foreign delegates. Nehru's government, while highly critical of any foreign influence in Indian political affairs, may hope that the Soviet Communist party, in contrast to the Chinese party, will exercise a moderating influence on the Indian party.

The last Indian Communist party congress was held in April 1958 at Amritsar, where the party formally adopted a "peaceful, parliamentary approach to power." Chronic factionalism among the Indian Communist leaders soon led to a renewed struggle over party policy, and the dissension was accentuated by the recent Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. A series of executive meetings in February failed to break the deadlock between the moderate and extremist groups. Leaders of the various factions are preparing for a showdown fight at the national congress in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, but the final outcome is more likely to take the form of a compromise designed to hold the party together for the elections.

25X1

5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5

	early next year. Suslov's presence will increase the pressure on rival leaders to compromise their differences.	
25X1	In recent months, Indian policies on the Congo, on the reorganization of the UN Secretariat, and on Laos have resulted in a deterioration of Indo-Soviet relations.	25X1
25X1		
<i>t</i>	·	05)//
		25X1

25X1

## Colombo and Peiping Sign 1961 Rice-Rubber Contract

The first five-year barter agreement was negotiated in late 1952. The conservative, pro-Western United National party government then in office was motivated solely by economic factors: at that time rice was difficult to obtain and world rubber prices were low.

Colombo has continued the exchange during the past eight years because the arrangement has provided a reliable source of nearly half the island's annual rice import requirements and a steady market for one of its three exports. Since 1953 all the annual contracts except last year's have involved a minimum exchange of about 200,000 tons of rice for 30,000 tons of Ceylon's rubber.

Negotiation of the yearly contract takes place alternately in Colombo and Peiping and normally is a routine process, although there occasionally have been protracted disputes over prices. The lengthy discussions on the 1960 contract marked the only occasion when the talks have taken a somewhat political turn; a few officials in the conservative caretaker regime in power in Ceylon at that time hoped to reduce the island's dependence on the pact, as well as to free for sale at better prices some of the rubber committed to China at fixed prices.

Burma is the other chief	source of the island's rice im-
ports.	
	·

25X1

25X1

5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7

### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

